Scope of Writ Against Private Parties IntroductionThe Indian Constitution, through Article 226, empowers every High Court to issue writs not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights under Part III but also for “any other purpose,” which includes legal rights that are not necessarily fundamental. Over time, judicial interpretation has expanded the reach of writ jurisdiction to include even private bodies, provided their actions involve a public law element. Where a private entity performs a public function or affects public interest, its actions can be examined under writ jurisdiction. In a time when many essential services are managed by private institutions, understanding when and how writs can be issued against such parties has become increasingly relevant. What is Writ of Mandamus ?The writ of mandamus is traditionally understood as a directive issued to public authorities to compel the performance of public duties. However, courts have clarified that this writ is not limited by the identity of the authority but rather determined by the nature of the function performed. When a private entity discharges duties that are public in character, the writ of mandamus may be issued even against such a private body.In St. Mary’s Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava, the Supreme Court once again clarified that the maintainability of a writ petition does not solely rest on whether the respondent is “State” under Article 12. What matters more is the nature of the function performed. In the same vein, the Court cited Binny Ltd. v. V. Sadasivan, holding that Article 226 is broadly framed to permit writs such as mandamus against private authorities, provided they are discharging public duties. It emphasized that “the decision sought to be corrected or enforced must be in the discharge of public function.”The key takeaway from these rulings is that public duty, not public ownership, is the determining factor for the maintainability of writ petitions. Essentials of Writ Jurisdiction Against Private Bodies 1. Discharge of Public FunctionsWrit jurisdiction lies against a body whether public or private, if it discharges a function that serves the general public or collective interest. This may include services fundamental to the community such as education, healthcare, transportation, or utilities. The performance of such duties, even when undertaken by a private actor, attracts public law obligations.The Supreme Court elaborated on this principle in St. Mary’s Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava, citing Binny Ltd. v. V. Sadasivan in Para 41:“A writ of mandamus or the remedy under Article 226 is pre-eminently a public law remedy and is not generally available as a remedy against private wrongs… The scope of mandamus is determined by the nature of the duty to be enforced, rather than the identity of the authority against whom it is sought. If the private body is discharging a public function and the denial of any right is in connection with the public duty imposed on such body, the public law remedy can be enforced.”The judgment clarified that even when the respondent is a private body, the existence of a public law element renders writ jurisdiction under Article 226 applicable. 2. Presence of a Public Law ElementThe presence of a public law element is key to invoking Article 226. When the rights in question arise from statutory duties, regulatory frameworks, or public expectations, writ jurisdiction extends even to private bodies.In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, the Supreme Court held that entities performing functions of public importance, especially those aligned with governmental duties, may be treated as “instrumentalities of the State”: “If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government.” 3. Check on Arbitrariness and Abuse of PowerWhen private bodies perform public functions, their actions must meet constitutional standards of fairness and accountability.In Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, the Supreme Court held that even in contractual matters, State authorities and by extension, private entities serving public roles must conform to Article 14 as stated :“A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This imposes the duty to act fairly and to adopt a procedure which is ‘fairplay in action’… Unfairness in the exercise of power may amount to an abuse or excess of power.”This judgment reinforces that arbitrary decision-making, even by non-State actors performing public functions, can invite judicial scrutiny under writ jurisdiction. 4. Enforcement of Rule of Law and Access to JusticeThe writ of mandamus serves as a constitutional safeguard when essential services are unjustly withheld. It ensures that legal entitlements linked to public interest are not defeated by procedural or contractual barriers.In Kamal Kant Automobiles v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., the Court held that:“For the prayer of restoration of dealership, the only remedy available to the petitioners is by means of a writ petition, as neither a civil suit is maintainable nor is this remedy available before an arbitrator…”When services vital to public life are withheld, writ jurisdiction provides a direct constitutional remedy. When Private Entities Are Treated as “State”Constitutional jurisprudence recognizes that certain private bodies, though legally distinct, may function as extensions of the State. In Sukhdev v. Bhagatram, the Court held that institutions engaged in matters of high public interest or performing essential public functions are, by virtue of their role, deemed government agencies. This position was reinforced in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, where the Court observed that corporations acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the government are subject to the same constitutional limitations as the State. If a body is financially, administratively, or functionally controlled by the State, or performs functions integral to governance, it cannot evade writ jurisdiction under Article 226. Statutory Mandate for State Intervention in Essential ServicesEssential services that impact public welfare are governed by the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, which empowers both the Central and State Governments to ensure their uninterrupted supply and fair distribution. Section 3(1), empowers the Central Government to regulate production and

Can a Well-Qualified Wife Get Maintenance Under Section 125 CrPC After Voluntary Separation, Given Her Earning Capacity? Author: Asra Siddiqui, Faculty of Law, Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) Section 125 CrPC is a welfare measure designed to prevent destitution by offering prompt maintenance relief to dependents unable to support themselves. It allows a Magistrate to order monthly maintenance for a wife, child, or parent neglected by someone who has sufficient means.In the case of wives, the court may direct the husband to provide maintenance if she cannot maintain herself. The term “wife” includes a divorced woman who has not remarried. However, maintenance can be denied if she is living in adultery, has left the husband without sufficient cause, or if the separation is mutually agreed upon. The essential condition is that the wife must be actually unable to maintain herself, not just theoretically unemployed or capable of earning. Can a well-qualified wife who voluntarily leaves the matrimonial home and severe communication still claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC?Courts have clarified that qualifications alone do not bar a woman from receiving maintenance. However, if a qualified wife with work experience intentionally avoids employment and leaves the home without valid reasons, this may justify denial of maintenance.Section 125 is not intended to support lifelong dependency when the wife is capable of earning but chooses not to. If it is shown that she left the matrimonial home without sufficient cause and has the ability to support herself, the court may consider this while deciding her claim. Case Precedents Sharadchandra Satbhai v. Indubai Satbhai, AIR 1978 Bom 369 (Bombay HC) Facts: The husband (petitioner) and wife (respondent) were married in 1963.The wife, Indubai, left the matrimonial home in 1969 with her two minor children, without informing the husband. The husband filed for judicial separation on the ground of desertion, which was granted ex parte in 1973.Indubai later filed for maintenance under Section 125 CrPC. The Magistrate rejected it, citing the prior decree of desertion.However, theRevisional Court overturned that rejection and granted her ₹60/month as maintenance. Issue: Whether a wife, against whom a judicial separation decree is granted on the ground of desertion, can still claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC, or is she barred by Section 125(4)? Para 8:“Now, in a case like the present one, when the civil Court has determined the issue of desertion and held that the wife has left her husband without reasonable cause and against his wish and without his consent, can it be said that she is still entitled to maintenance under Section 125 and not hit bySub-section (4)? It is plain and simple that she has refused to live with her husband without any sufficient reason and, therefore, disentitled herself to receive maintenance under Section 125.” Para 8 (contd.):“The effect of the decree for judicial separation on this particular ground of desertion cannot be overlooked by the Magistrate dealing with an application under Section 125 because he has to bear in mind the disability created by Sub-section (4) of that section.” Para 8 (conclusion):“In our judgment, Indubai is not entitled to maintenance under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, as she had no reasonable ground not to live with her husband.” The High Court held that since Indubai had willfully deserted her husband and a judicial separation decree confirmed that, she was disqualified from claiming maintenance under Section 125(4) CrPC. “In the result, the impugned order dated September 30, 1976 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dhule, is quashed.” If a woman refuses to live with her husband without sufficient reason, and a civil court finds her guilty of desertion, she cannot claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC due to the bar under Section 125(4). Chanchal Mehta v. Supriya Mehta, Crl. Revn. No. 365 of 2016 (P&H HC, 29 Jan 2016) The petitioner-husband, Chanchal Mehta, challenged an order dated 17.12.2015 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Fazilka, whereby his wife Supriya Mehta was granted interim maintenance of ₹20,000/- per month from the date of application under Section 125 CrPC.The couple was married on 21.01.2006 and had a daughter who resided with the husband. The wife claimed she had no income and was unable to maintain herself. The husband argued that the wife was professionally qualified and capable of earning a livelihood. However, no documents were produced to prove she was earning. The trial court granted interim maintenance, which the husband challenged via a criminal revision petition before the High Court. Issue: Whether a professionally qualified but unemployed wife is entitled to interim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC, despite her capacity to earn.:On interpretation of “unable to maintain herself”“As per provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C., the expression ‘unable to maintain herself’ clearly shows that it does not mean ‘capable of earning’. In other words the expression puts the emphasis on the wife being unable to maintain herself and not on the capacity of wife to ‘earn for herself’.” On burden of proof: “In the present case, neither it is stated in the reply filed of the petition nor argued that the respondent-wife is earning. Simply it has been mentioned that the respondent-wife is possessing professional qualification and can earn her livelihood.” From Bhagwan Dutt v. Kamala Devi, (1975) 2 SCC 386: “The wife should be in a position to maintain a standard of living which is neither luxurious nor penurious but what is consistent with status of family.The expression ‘unable to maintain herself’ does not mean that the wife must be absolutely destitute when she applies for maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C.” On sacrifice of a career by wife:“Despite holding a higher educational qualification, it is not incumbent on the part of the wife to go for a job particularly when she is prepared to sacrifice a prospective career for the sake of her family.” From Sunita Kachwaha v. Anil Kachwaha, 2014 (4) RCR (Criminal) 831: “Merely because the wife was earning money and may be highly qualified but that cannot be a ground to reject the claim

The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005: A Comprehensive Guide The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005: A Comprehensive Guide Author : Shreya Mishra, National Law Institute University, Bhopal Introduction The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as The DV Act) was strictly drafted to provide a remedy in civil law for the protection of women and to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in society. Its sole intention is to protect women irrespective of the relationship she shares with the accused. However, even today, a significant number of victims remain unaware of how to invoke the provisions of the Act to safeguard themselves from such abuse. Therefore, this blog tries to provide an acute understanding of how the DV Act operates and how women can access the protections it guarantees. What is the Domestic Violence Act, 2005? The DV Act is meant to provide for more effective protection of the rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. What Constitutes Domestic Violence? Under this section, the focus is on the criterion to label an act as domestic violence, essentially what types of abuse are covered under this act. The honorable court had underscored recently that there are various types of domestic violence, i.e., physical, mental, sexual, verbal, emotional, and economic. Section 3 of the Act specifically provides the answer for this query. It mentions that any act, omission, commission, or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it: (a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb, or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse, and economic abuse; or (b) harasses, harms, injures, or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or (c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or (d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person. The court in the Bhartiben Tamboli Case had succinctly laid down the meaning of all these different types of domestic violence, wherein it had stated the following: Physical Abuse: Physical abuse is the use of physical force against a woman in a way that causes her bodily injury or hurt. Physical assault, criminal intimidation, and criminal force are also forms of physical abuse like beating, kicking, punching, throwing objects, damaging property, punched walls, kicked doors, abandoning her in a dangerous or unfamiliar place, using a weapon to threaten or hurt her, forcing her to leave the matrimonial home, hurting her children, using physical force in sexual situations. Sexual Abuse: Sexual abuse is also a form of physical abuse. Any situation in which a woman is forced to participate in unwanted, safe, or degrading sexual activity, calling her sexual names, hurting a woman with objects and weapons during sex, is sexual abuse. Forced sex, even by a spouse or intimate partner with whom she has consensual sex, is an act of aggression and violence. Emotional Abuse: Not all abusive relationships involve violence. Many women suffer from emotional abuse, which is no less destructive. Unfortunately, emotional abuse is often minimized or overlooked—even by the woman being abused. Emotional abuse includes verbal abuse such as yelling, name-calling, blaming, and shaming. Isolation, intimidation, and controlling behaviour also fall under emotional abuse. Calls her names, insults her, or continually criticizes her. Economic Abuse: Economic abuse is not a very recognized form of abuse among women, but it is very detrimental. Economic abuse mainly includes a woman not being provided with enough money by her partner to maintain herself and her children, which may comprise money for food, clothing, medicines, etc., and not allowing a woman to take up employment. Forcing her out of the house where she lives and not providing her rent, in case of a rented sharehold, also amounts to abuse. Depriving her of all or any economic or financial resources to which the person is entitled under the law or custom, restricting the woman’s access to the shared household. Disposing or alienating the assets of the women whether movable or immovable, valuables, shares, securities, bonds, and the like other property in which she may have an interest. However, seeking maintenance to unjustly enrich oneself and that too without providing the alleged act of domestic violence is a gross abuse of the process of law. Who Can File a Complaint Under This Act? Any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent becomes an “aggrieved person” by the virtue of Section 2(a) of the act and therefore can file a complaint under this act. In fact, as per Section 4 of the act, any person who has reason to believe that an act of domestic violence has been, or is being, or is likely to be committed, may give information about it to the concerned Protection Officer. Confusion regarding whether a woman in a live-in relationship can file such a complaint persisted until the apex court in D. Veluswamy v. D. Patchaiammal enumerated five ingredients to be fulfilled for a woman of a live-in relationship to file a complaint under the said act: 1. Both parties must behave as husband and wife and are recognized as husband and wife in front of society. 2. They must be of a valid legal age of marriage. 3. They should qualify to enter into marriage, e.g., none of the partners should have a spouse living at the time of entering into the relationship. 4. They must have